The NTSB recently released its Preliminary Investigative Report regarding the tragic crash of N321BA, a Cessna 208B Caravan being operated by Bering Air in the State of Alaska. The aircraft crashed on February 6th, 2025, near Nome, Alaska in icing conditions. Sadly, all 10 souls on board were lost.
The preliminary report highlights disturbing parallels between this fatal accident and the near-fatal accident of N97HA, another Alaskan Cessna 208B Caravan operated by Wright Air Service, which occurred on August 16, 2021. Aviation Law Group represented the victims of the Wright Air accident and are deeply concerned to see disturbing similarities between both accidents.
Notably, both aircraft were flown into known icing conditions, and now we have learned that, apparently, both were loaded well in excess of their allowable weight limits.
Similarities between these two accidents are significant and concerning. Both Caravans were substantially overweight for flight in icing conditions, with violations of their weight limits contributing critically to each accident scenario:
- The Bering Air Caravan (N321BA) was equipped with a supplemental belly cargo pod and a TKS “weeping wing” anti-icing system designed to distribute antifreeze fluid across porous leading-edge surfaces to prevent ice accumulation. TKS systems deploys a special antifreeze fluid across various surfaces on the aircraft through porous leading-edge surfaces on various portions of the aircraft such as the wings, lift struts, and tail. The modifications to N321BA incorporated changes to the operating parameters of the aircraft, including the allowable weights of the 208B from its specifications as delivered from the factory. Despite these modifications, the NTSB determined that N321BA took off approximately 1,058 lbs. heavier than its maximum allowable gross weight for flight into icing conditions and 803 lbs. over its maximum allowable gross weight for normal operations.
- Comparatively, the Wright Air Caravan (N97HA), operated without a TKS system and instead relied on inflatable de-icing boots. De-ice boots operate by channeling pressurized air into inflatable channels that break the ice off of the leading edges mechanically rather than preventing ice from attaching to surfaces like TKS fluid does. Wright Air Services Caravan, was also overweight and found to have been 538 lbs. heavier than its allowed takeoff weight and 1050 lbs. heavier than the maximum weight for flight into known icing.
Critically, when any aircraft picks up ice, it not only reduces the aerodynamic efficiency of the aircraft by adding drag due to the rough surface presented by the ice, but it also adds significant weight to the airframe. Water weighs more than 8 lbs. per gallon. As such, as with N97HA, N321BA would have likely been pushed even further outside of its weight envelope as it accumulated ice during the accident flight.
As a result, both flights experienced critical losses of control, and from this, the Bering Air flight was tragically unable to recover.
- During the Wright Air flight, the airplane entered an uncontrolled spin after its airspeed decreased below 100 knots, significantly below the prescribed icing conditions minimum speed. The aircraft spiraled toward the ground for approximately 40 seconds before the pilot managed a recovery, exceeding the aircraft’s never-exceed airspeed by approximately 70 knots. This near-catastrophic event resulted in substantial structural damage but miraculously no fatalities.
- The Bering Air flight exhibited a similar loss of airspeed and control shortly before its fatal crash. According to the preliminary NTSB findings, the Bering Air Caravan’s autopilot disengaged when the airplane’s airspeed dropped to 99 knots. It then rapidly slowed below the 95 knots minimum indicated airspeed required when utilizing a TKS anti-ice system. Within seconds, airspeed further declined to approximately 70 knots, correlating to an unrecoverable aerodynamic stall.
After the Wright Air accident, the NTSB identified shortcomings in FAA regulations concerning weight and balance documentation for single-engine commuter operations under Part 135. The Wright Air report specifically called attention to the absence of mandatory weight and balance documentation requirements for single-engine aircraft, which might have alerted pilots to unsafe operating conditions prior to departure. Single Engine Part 135 operators are not required to retain their weight and balance records nor prepare a load manifest. Since at least 1989, the NTSB has repeatedly recommended, after multiple deadly crashes, that the FAA change this regulation. The FAA has not taken action, and this regulatory gap persists today. As the Bering Air accident shows, these systemic issues are still unresolved.
At this preliminary stage, it is unknown if any mechanical failures contributed significantly to the accident. NTSB testing of the TKS anti-ice system on the Bering Air Caravan is ongoing, but initial post-accident examinations indicated continuity of fluid flow from the TKS panels.
At this juncture, Aviation Law Group emphasizes that both NTSB reports underline crucial similarities—operating overweight aircraft in known severe icing conditions, failure to maintain required minimum airspeeds, and inadequate regulatory guidance or adherence regarding load documentation. The tragic outcome of the Bering Air crash underscores the critical importance of strict adherence to the pilot operating handbook, compliance with safety regulations, and improved forecasting of hazardous icing conditions.
Our attorneys continue to investigate and monitor developments closely. We remain committed to providing support, guidance, and representation to families and victims of aviation accidents throughout Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. Should you have any questions or information relevant to this investigation, please contact Aviation Law Group at info@aviationlawgroup.com or directly at (206) 251-5915.
The NTSB Preliminary Report Follows: