The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued its final report on the December 18, 2022, severe turbulence incident involving Hawaiian Airlines Flight 35, confirming much of what we at Aviation Law Group discovered in our own investigation. This flight, an Airbus A330-200 operating from Phoenix to Honolulu, flew into an embedded thunderstorm, which caused the pilots to lose control of the aircraft while cruising at a high altitude near the Hawaiian Islands. This violent loss of control left multiple passengers and flight attendants injured—some with serious injuries—and caused significant damage to the aircraft’s interior. This was no clear air turbulence. It was known, foreseeable, and avoidable.
We should have “gone around it.”
The NTSB’s final report provides a comprehensive look at the facts leading up to the incident. According to the report, Hawaiian Airlines Flight 35 was at Flight Level 400 (about 40,000 feet) over the Hawaiian Islands. Meteorological conditions along the route were forecast to be unstable, with abundant moisture and isolated thunderstorms, creating the potential for severe or extreme turbulence with reported tops up to 41,000 feet.
At Aviation Law Group, our legal team has been working nearly two years on behalf of our clients, into understanding exactly what happened aboard Flight 35 and why. The NTSB’s final report has now independently confirmed many of the key points we identified in our investigation. The board’s conclusions make it clear that the airline and its crew had knowledge of severe weather risks, had tools at their disposal to avoid dangerous conditions, and yet chose a course of action that ultimately placed passengers and crew in grave danger.
The captain and first-officer on the flight had been warned prior to departure by the flight dispatcher that areas of embedded convective activity and turbulence lay ahead. Weather forecasting products, including Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) bulletins, were also provided to the flight crew, indicating potential severe turbulence.
The NTSB’s findings state that, despite having sufficient meteorological information and being aware of the risk of severe turbulence along the route, the flight crew elected to maintain course and altitude. The crew observed a rapidly developing “plume” of cloud directly ahead. Although the cloud formation was rising quickly, and the crew acknowledged that it was building fast, they did not deviate around it. Instead, the aircraft continued straight into this thunderstorm. This was no clear air turbulence.
Hawaiian Airlines Flight Crew Operating manual states the following:
This storm cell exceeded the aircraft’s cruising altitude of 40,000 feet. To comply with Hawaiian Airline’s operating procedures, the crew should have gone around it by deviating more than 40 nautical miles.
The NTSB’s statement that the flight crew should have “gone around” the storm cell confirms a central aspect of our allegations: this was an avoidable accident. Had the pilots taken the safer route, the severe turbulence encounter might never have occurred. Had more forceful, timely warnings been issued, fewer passengers would have been injured. These failures constitute negligence, and they are precisely why we continue to fight on behalf of the injured passengers.
Operating in Coffin Corner
Our position has been that the flight crew, as well as Hawaiian Airlines, owed the highest degree of care to their passengers. This duty is not just a general obligation—it is a key principle in aviation operations. When dangerous conditions are present, proactive measures can and should be taken, including altering course, adjusting altitude, and issuing timely warnings to cabin crew and passengers.
Yet, this crew decided to fly at the edge of the A330’s performance in what is known in the industry as Coffin Corner.
Coffin corner is a situation that occurs when an airplane is flying at very high altitude where two dangerous limits—flying too slow and flying too fast—are uncomfortably close together. At these heights, the airplane’s stall speed (the slowest speed it can fly while still generating enough lift to stay in the air) rises, and at the same time, the speed at which it can safely fly without encountering shock waves on its wings (the “critical Mach number”) drops. Eventually, these two speeds get so close that the pilot has almost no “safe” speed range to work with. If the airplane flies even a little too slowly, it risks stalling and losing altitude. If it flies just a bit too fast, it risks hitting shock waves or severe turbulence that can cause the plane to lose lift or become uncontrollable.
In other words, as the airplane climbs higher, its safe “speed window” grows narrower. At coffin corner, that window is tiny—sometimes just a few knots—which makes flying safely very challenging. Changes in weight, slight turns, or gusts of turbulence can quickly push the airplane from one dangerous limit to the other. Because the risks at these altitudes are so high, pilots and airlines typically avoid getting that close to coffin corner unless they are flying specialized aircraft designed to operate at such extremes.
The service ceiling for the A330 is 41,000 feet. This flight was operating at 40,000 feet, where there is no margin for error if the aircraft encounters turbulence that increases its altitude and/or puts an additional g-force load on it.
Aircraft manufacturers provide pilots with a “buffet chart” that indicates, based on the weight of the aircraft, at what altitude it is safe to operate if an aircraft encounters a 1.3g or 1.5g turbulence incident. This is a key reference in flight planning in forecast turbulence because if the aircraft is operating above the recommended altitude, the g forces exerted by the turbulence can cause the wing to exceed its critical angle of attack and cause it to stall.
In this accident, the turbulence pushed the aircraft higher than 40,400 feet and applied a g-force load in excess of positive 2Gs. The result was as anticipated: the aircraft stalled, rolled 40 degrees, and dropped 1,000 feet.
No warning to Passengers or Flight Attendants
The turbulence encounter was not a minor “bump” in the sky. It was a violent in-flight upset causing severe injuries—some of which continue to affect the victims to this day. Within moments, the aircraft experienced vertical accelerations more than twice the force of gravity, followed by an extended period of -1G force, violently jolting passengers and crew. Some passengers were ejected from their seats, thrown against the cabin ceiling, and crashed back down to the floor. Several overhead bins were torn open, ceiling panels dislodged, and heavy objects, including passenger luggage, were hurled through the cabin.
As a point of reference, a positive 2G force is equivalent to having twice your body weight pull you down. The aircraft also sustained negative Gs, which caused the passengers to slam into the ceiling.
Passengers suffered broken bones, head injuries, lacerations, severe psychological trauma, and deep emotional distress. Some passengers continue to suffer from anxiety, fear of flying, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other mental and emotional injuries.
In addition to the physical and mental toll, passengers lost the enjoyment of their planned Christmas vacations, with many dealing with ongoing medical care, disrupted travel plans, and lingering fears of air travel. The chaotic aftermath, where severely injured passengers had to fend for themselves or rely on the heroic efforts of flight attendants (most of whom were also injured), underscores the systemic failures that day. The NTSB findings highlight these harsh realities and remind us of the profound human costs when airlines and crew fail in their duties.
According to the NTSB’s report, the crew had the information and the opportunity to make a safer decision. Yet the flight crew pressed on at a high altitude, leaving no margin for altitude adjustments, and made no lateral deviation to avoid the developing weather cell.
Furthermore, our investigation has found that the crew did not provide any additional, clear warning to passengers or flight attendants. In fact, just minutes before the accident, flight attendants informed passengers that they could get up to go to the bathroom and retrieve pens to fill out the agricultural forms.
The NTSB report notes that this lack of timely communication potentially contributed to more severe injuries, as passengers were not fully aware of the imminent danger. If passengers and cabin crew had received a prompt, stern warning to remain seated and secured, it is likely that the number and severity of injuries would have been reduced.
Moving Forward
This final NTSB report provides crucial clarity and authoritative confirmation of the dangerous decisions and inadequate precautions taken on Flight 35. With this regulatory agency’s findings now on record, it is time for Hawaiian Airlines and other air carriers to reflect on how to prevent similar incidents in the future. More importantly, it is time for accountability.
Our firm remains dedicated to seeking justice and fair compensation for the injured passengers and their families. We will continue to advocate for those harmed by avoidable airline negligence, ensuring that the lessons learned from this NTSB report lead to meaningful changes in flight operations, improved training, and better communication protocols in the face of hazardous weather conditions.
In the wake of the NTSB’s final report, Aviation Law Group is ready to assist other injured passengers. We have the experience, resources, and commitment to hold responsible parties accountable, striving for safer skies and safer travel for everyone. If you were injured on Hawaiian Airlines Flight 35, we urge you to reach out to us.